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Bercuson: CWM and Bomber Command

The Canadian War Museum and
Bomber Command
My Perspective

David J. Bercuson

F

our years ago I became embroiled
in the controversy arising from
the Canadian War Museum’s exhibit
of the Allied bomber war, also called
the “Combined Bomber Offensive”
or CBO. That controversy came to
the public’s attention in the fall of
2006 due to the objections of the
portrayal of the bomber war in the
museum by Canadian veterans of
Bomber Command. The veterans
were joined by, among others, former
Canadian chief of the defence staff
Paul Manson, who had also been
commander of Canadian Forces Air
Command and a fighter pilot with
the Royal Canadian Air Force in
Europe during the Cold War.1 They
made various claims that the exhibit
had, deliberately or inadvertently,
portrayed the bomber war as terror
bombing and akin to a war crime.
They made their case in the media
and in front of a Senate committee.2
Eventually they succeeded in having
the words of the exhibit altered. At no
time did I ever have any connection
to any of those activities nor did I
register any opinion about what they
were saying. I had played a role in
an earlier kerfuffle as an advisor to
the CBC Ombudsman at the time of
the “Valour and the Horror” series; I
had no intention of getting involved
in any such public controversy again.
I first saw the magnificent new
Canadian War Museum a few months

Abstract: This article is based on David
Bercuson’s keynote address at the
22nd Military History Colloquium held
at the University of Waterloo in May
2011. Bercuson discusses his role in the
controversy over the panel text about
the Combined Bomber Offensive at the
new Canadian War Museum. Arguing
that the original text was not wrong,
but reflected older scholarship, he
concludes by observing that no serious
scholar, whether a single author or a
museum staff, should be saved from
the age-old processes of historical
review, revision and re-writing to reflect
more recent research when it is more
accurate.

after it opened in 2005 when I was
invited to sit on a panel organized
by the Canadian Council of Chief
Executives at the museum. I cannot
remember the topic. I do remember
that we panellists were given a
guided tour of the museum and I
distinctly remember being disturbed
by the words of one panel of the
bomber exhibit which declared: “The
value and morality of the strategic
bomber offensive against Germany
remains bitterly contested. Bomber
Command’s aim was to crush
civilian morale and force Germany
to surrender by destroying its cities
and industrial installations. Although
Bomber Command and American
attacks left 600,000 Germans dead,
and more than five million homeless,
the raids resulted in only small
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reductions in German war production
until late in the war.” The pictures on
the panel to the immediate left of
those words showed, from top to
bottom, a heavily damaged factory
complex, a heavily damaged German
city with a destroyed bridge and
finally pictures of burned German
corpses lying in a street or square.
I had little argument with the
statement of Bomber Command’s
aims. I was more than familiar with
the history of Bomber Command and
its commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Arthur Harris, including his refusal
to accede to the wishes the chief of
the air staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, expressed so often
in 1944, that Harris ease off his area
attacks and focus on major strategic
targets such as oil, transportation
and the aircraft industry. I also knew
that about one quarter of Bomber
Command’s targets were German
war industry. I was also fully aware
that the United States Strategic
Bombing Survey (USSBS) and the
British Bombing Survey Unit (BBSU)
– and some historians of the air
war – had concluded that bombing
Germany had limited results through
most of the war.3 Indeed, volume III
of the official history of the RCAF,
The Crucible of War, had arrived at
the same conclusion4 though with
little research and analysis of its own.
But other historians and air power
55
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theorists had concluded that bombing
had indeed done much damage
to the German war economy.5 My
initial reaction was that Canadian
War Museum historians had come
down on the side represented by the
USSBS and the BBSU. But so what?
History is replete with conflicts of
interpretation.
I visited the museum twice more
in the fall of 2006 and amidst the rising
public controversy I e-mailed a friend
at the war museum. I said this: “I am
not getting into this [controversy]
at all because at the end of the day I
strongly defend the Museum staff’s
duty to depict events as they see
them. But my personal view is this:
to say flat out that German war
production was not affected until the
end of the war completely ignores
the great slack in the German war
economy that existed in 1939/40.
The real question is, how much more
would the Germans have produced if
there had been no bombing? I’ll leave
it at that. If asked I will say this. If
not, I will stay out. So far no one has
asked.”6

An Enduring Controversy
(original panel text):
The value and morality of the strategic
bomber offensive against Germany
remains bitterly contested. Bomber
Command’s aim was to crush civilian
morale and force Germany to surrender
by destroying its cities and industrial
installations. Although Bomber
Command and American attacks left
600,000 Germans dead, and more than
five million homeless, the raids resulted
in only small reductions in German war
production until late in the war.

Now, the question I posed
in that e-mail is a counterfactual
question. But then much of the
controversy over the actual effect
of the Combined Bomber Offensive
is built on counterfactual discourse.
To an extent, the amount of damage
done to Germany by the bombing
can be measured, and has been,
several times over. So we can roughly
estimate what happened even though
some controversy remains as to when
the bombing began to have a real
and incontrovertible impact. But

we cannot know what else might
have happened if, say, Harris had
gone along with Portal and shifted
completely to industrial targets.
Thus the conclusions reached by both
the USSBS and the BBSU, as well
as a number of historical observers
– most recently Randall Hansen –
that different outcomes might have
occurred if this or that had changed
in the course of the CBO is entirely
counterfactual. I believe that the
very business of history often takes
us very close to counter factual
argumentation, but I also believe that
once our opinions begin to be based
on what we think might have been as
opposed to what was, we are on very
dangerous ground.
There is a point in “Godfather
III” where an aging Don Michael
Corleone declares:”Just when I
thought I was out... they pull me back
in.” That’s how I got involved. In midDecember Dr. Victor Rabinovitch,
president and CEO of the Canadian
Museum of Civilization, called me to
ask if I would join a number of other
historians in evaluating the bomber

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre (CFJIC) PL 42536

The German city of Cologne, smashed by Allied bombing, as it appeared in 1945 .
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war display. I was very reluctant to
get involved and I told him about
the note I had already written to
my friend at the museum. He did
not change his mind. I then told
him that I wanted to consult with
another colleague of mine before
giving him my answer. I talked to
Jack Granatstein. He urged me to
accept. I did. Then I informed my
friend at the museum on 11 January
2007. I wrote: “I stressed to Mr. R. my
absolute confidence in you and the
rest of the staff. The professionalism,
etc. Your credentials. I told him I’d
write nothing that I would not say to
you over a scotch.”7
I went to look at the exhibit for a
fourth time on the last day of January
2007. This time I read every word
of every panel and took copious
photographs. Then I wrote up my
report. It is on the record, and I will
not read it here in its entirety. None of
the complaints made by the veterans
changed my own view of the panel.
I basically ignored the public debate.
I believed then and I believe now
that every Canadian has a right to
his or her own opinion on just about
anything and veterans no less. But
I am also mindful of the words of
the late US Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan that “everyone is entitled
to his own opinion, but not to his
own facts,” and I didn’t think that
the public debate was producing any
new facts or adding new information
to the historical record. So I based
my report on my reading of several
dozen books and many articles that
had appeared on the bomber war up
to that point including those that had
concluded that the bomber war was
largely a waste. This is how I started
my report:
The Combined Bomber Offensive was of
inestimable value in the Allied victory
over the Axis in the Second World;
• An enormous amount of resources
was devoted to the CBO in both
men and materiel and I seriously
doubt whether or not any “reliable”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

The Bombing Campaign
(revised panel text):
The strategic bombing campaign
against Germany, an important part of
the Allied effort that achieved victory,
remains a source of controversy today.
Strategic bombing enjoyed wide public
and political support as a symbol
of Allied resolve and a response to
German aggression. In its first years,
the air offensive achieved few of its
objectives and suffered heavy losses.
Advances in technology and tactics,
combined with Allied successes on
other fronts, led to improved results.
By war’s end, Allied bombers had
razed portions of every major city in
Germany and damaged many other
targets, including oil facilities and
transportation networks. The attacks
blunted Germany’s economic and
military potential, and drew scarce
resources into air defence, damage
repair, and the protection of critical
industries. Allied aircrew conducted
this gruelling offensive with great
courage against heavy odds. It required
vast material and industrial efforts
and claimed over 80,000 Allied lives,
including more than 10,000 Canadians.
While the campaign contributed greatly
to enemy war weariness, German
society did not collapse despite
600,000 dead and more than five
million left homeless. Industrial output
fell substantially, but not until late in the
war. The effectiveness and the morality
of bombing heavily-populated areas in
war continue to be debated.

•

•
•
•

or “scientific” answer will ever be
given as to whether or not those
resources were “well” or efficiently
spent as compared to other possible
use of those resources;
Allied war leaders from President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill to the air chiefs sincerely
and deeply believed that the CBO
would contribute enormously to the
winning of the war – Sir Arthur
Harris seems to have believed that
bombing alone might win it;
Bombing alone did not win the war.
The nature of the war – total war –
frames this controversy;
The Allied leaders of 1941/42 had
little choice but to use an air war as

•

•
•

one means of striking at Nazi power
until sufficient ground forces were
available to do so;
The smashing of German cities was
a deliberate act. Enemy morale was
most certainly a target of the CBO
and although the outright killing of
civilians is almost never referred to
in wartime documents as an actual
aim, other euphemisms are employed
(such as “de-housing”) so as to
give a general picture that German
cities, and everything in them
that sustained the life, civilization,
and culture of the enemy, and
specifically his productive capacity,
were legitimate targets of war;
They most certainly were legitimate
targets of war…;
The utter devastation visited upon
German cities, and German society,
economy, infrastructure, way of life,
etc, by the CBO was a major factor
in both dispelling any “stab in the
back” myth following the Allied
victory and in convincing post-war
German leaders to pursue economic
integration with the rest of Europe
as a means of ending intra-European
conflict.

I also said “I believe that, on the
whole, the museum has provided a
balanced presentation of Canada’s
role in the bomber war.” I observed
that a panel on the other side of the
room had declared that “Attacks
on industrial centres, military
installations and cities devastated
vast areas and killed hundreds
of thousands. They also diverted
German resources from other fronts
and damaged essential elements of
the German war effort.” I pointed
out that those words contradicted
the words in the panel that was the
centre of so much controversy.8 So
here was the same museum and the
same staff but with different words
about the same set of events. That
was puzzling.
As to the panel in question, I
agreed entirely with the first sentence
of the panel which said that both the
57
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time nor the space to summarize the
literature as it existed in 2006. Had I
had more time and space, I could have
marshalled the massive evidence
then in existence which showed that
the sentence was historically faulty
in two significant ways. First it says
that the reductions in German war
production were “small” and then
it says that they only really had an
impact until later in the war.
Let’s look at the first point.
Recent scholarship – but scholarship
available to the Museum staff by
2006 – shows that early conclusions
arrived at by J.K. Galbraith and the
USSBS, the BBSU, Max Hastings,
The Crucible of War, and others about
the ineffectiveness of the bombing
were quite simply wrong. There is no
time here to do a thorough literature
review of some of those works but
I will mention Richard Overy, Why
the Allies Won (1995), Gian P. Gentile,
How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?
(2001), Alan J. Levine, The Strategic
Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945
(1992), Robin Neillands, The Bomber
War (2001), Stephen L. McFarland,
America’s Pursuit of Precision Bombing,
1910-1945 (2004), Stephen Bodiansky,
Air Power (2004) and last but not
least, Adam Tooze, The Wages of
Destruction: The Making and Breaking
of the Nazi Economy (2006). All of these
historians came to essentially the
same conclusions: Allied bombing
began the systematic destruction of
the Luftwaffe by early 1944. Allied
bombing destroyed the German
synthetic oil industry by the fall of
1944. Allied bombing wreaked havoc
with the German rail transportation
system by mid-1944 and the canal
system by the fall of 1944. German
war industry was dead by the start of
1945. All from bombing.
Adam Tooze, whose primary
sources were largely drawn from the
Third Reich’s own statistics or from
German wartime industry, discusses
some of these impacts in minute
detail. He shows how bombing
literally cut the Ruhr off from the rest

of Germany, and warped the already
overstretched German war economy
to such an extent that virtually every
kind of economic activity in Germany
was dedicated to war production and
everything else was stamped out by
the Nazis. He shows that the impact
of the bombing on fighter production,
for example, was to force the Germans
to keep on building more and more
obsolete aircraft like the Bf 109. He
concludes that “it was not territorial
losses that paralyzed the German
economy but the onset of a campaign
of aerial bombardment, of completely
unprecedented intensity.”9
Virtually all these authors wrote
about both the RAF’s “area” bombing
campaign and the USAAF “precision”
campaign. It can be argued that it
was really the US bombing that did
most of that damage; Speer certainly
declared that to be so.10 But in the
last sentence of the Canadian War
Museum panel, the words refer to
“Bomber Command and American
attacks” killing 600,000 Germans. It
does not separate the two campaigns.
It is a fair statement because the
USAAF did engage in area bombing
in Europe, although not nearly with
the ferocity that Bomber Command
did.11
The later authors I mentioned
above are no more the guardians of
historical truth than the earlier ones,
but there is, in my view, a clear trend
that has emerged over the last 15 or so
years in those whose work has been
rooted in German sources. Namely,
that the Combined Bomber Offensive
was, as Overy claimed, a decisive
factor in Allied victory. That point
of view is completely ignored in the
offending paragraph. I must say that
even more recent scholarship such
as Randall Wakelam’s The Science of
Bombing (2009) and Robert S. Ehlers
Jr., Targeting the Third Reich (2009)
have added to the mountain of
evidence that now exists. It is a fact,
not interpretation, that the bomber
war added greatly to Allied victory
and that the bombing campaign

CFJIC PL 42872

value and the morality of the CBO
“remains bitterly contested.” I then
suggested that the words “one of” be
inserted into the second sentence of
the panel statement so that it would
read “one of Bomber Command’s
aims was to crush civilian morale…”
instead of “Bomber Command’s aim
was to crush civilian morale.” I made
that suggestion because although
Harris declared from time to time
that his aim was to destroy virtually
every German city and kill as many
civilians as he could, his aircraft did
attack precision and industrial targets
from Peenemünde to the dams raid to
the Dortmund-Ems Canal to major oil
and transportation targets and so on.
To declare that Bomber Command’s
sole aim was to crush German morale
was simply wrong. This is not a
matter of interpretation. It is a matter
of fact.
I found two things troubling
about the third sentence which
began with the word “although,”
as in “Although Bomber Command
and American attacks….” I thought
then and I think now that the word
“although” added an editorial tone to
the statement. It implies that the great
loss of German life was inflicted for
little positive return to the Allied war
effort. I thought that was taking sides
in the controversy by suggesting
that the bombing was a waste of
resources and took “innocent”
civilian life to no real effect. The
second problem with the sentence
was that it ignored the whole issue
about what impact bombing had on
Germany’s mobilization of its war
resources after 1942/1943.
Now admittedly, as I said earlier,
I was raising a counter factual point.
No one can ever know what might
have happened to the mobilization of
German war production after Albert
Speer became minister of armaments
and war production in early 1942
had the CBO been terminated at that
point. Thus I admit that there were
better arguments I could have made.
My excuse is that I had neither the

4
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A Canadian Halifax awaits its next mission. In the foreground sits the cache of deadly bombs.

began to seriously erode Germany’s
capacity to re-arm itself at least as
early as Operation Pointblank in
February 1944 – a date that was
certainly not “late in the war.”
Now to the second point. There
is an implication in using a phrase
such as “late in the war” that it was
essentially all over but the shouting.
Or, we had pounded them enough
by then, the war was as good as won,
so it was time to let up, at least with
area bombing. The argument is often
made when referring to the bombing
of Dresden in mid-February 1945. But
what does “late in the war mean?”
What did the war museum’s staff
mean when they used the words “late
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

in the war”? Could they have meant,
say, 12 January 1945? That was the
day the Red Army launched its last
great offensive of the war. It is also
a date by which Hitler’s Ardennes
offensive had been completely
snuffed out at terrible cost to the
Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, and the
western Allies were entering the last
phases of preparing for the Battle of
the Rhineland that would begin on
8 February. The war in Europe had
raged for roughly five years, four
months and two weeks; it had about
115 days – eleven weeks – to run.
Well, what did happen after 12
January 1945? Someone has made
the calculation that about 22,000

people – soldiers and combatants –
were killed each day of the war. That
is a very rough and perhaps unfair
figure to use in an analysis such as
this, but the point can be made that
if 12 January 1945 was “late in the
war,” then about 2.5 million more
people were yet to die in cities, in
death and concentration camps, in
underground rocket manufacturing
bunkers and, of course on the fighting
fronts, at sea and in the air. Hitler
had 11 weeks yet to shoot himself in
his bunker in Berlin. So even by 12
January 1945 there was a huge chunk
of the war remaining and although
German chances of victory were nil
by then, a lot more people were killed
59
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I went on to say :
I believe that the attempt
CFJIC PL 144257

before the end came
because Hitler would
not surrender, and the
high ranks of the Nazi
Party – including Speer
– stood with him and
did all they could to
keep the war going.
And what of
Canada’s soldiers? If
12 January is taken
as “late in the war” –
and thus of little real
consequence – what
are we to make of the
approximately 5,300
Canadians who were
killed or wounded
in the Battle of the
Rhineland alone. If
the war was all over
but the shouting on 12
January 1945, a lot of
Canadians were yet to
be killed or wounded.
Thus to declare that
Allied bombing had
little effect until “late
in the war” is virtually
meaningless because
the phrase “late in the
war” is only true in
the temporal sense if
we accept 12 January
1945 as the point where
“lateness” begins.
But the phrase
“late in the war,” like
“late in life” or “late in the game”
is not precise. Churchill became
prime minister “late in life.” The
Blue Jays won their second World
Series “late in the game.” The phrase
is descriptive in some ways but is
close to useless if we seek precision.
When a museum, or a historian, uses
but three sentences to summarize a
long-standing controversy, the words
chosen should be selected with great
care to convey as much clarity as
possible.
These factors were behind the
conclusions I arrived at: “that the
exhibit as it now stands does not

to achieve balance is,
in fact, too balanced
and that one statement
in the exhibit, namely
“Attacks on industrial
centres, military
installations and cities
devastated vast areas
and killed hundreds
of thousands. They
also diverted German
resources from other
fronts and damaged
essential elements of the
German war effort”–
which in my view is
correct – is in direct
contradiction to the
statement… “Although
Bomber Command
and American attacks
left 600,000 Germans
dead, and more than
five million homeless,
the raids resulted in
only small reductions
in

German

war

production until
late in the war.” The
contradiction should
be resolved…. I think

A Lancaster, with its bomb bay doors open,
flies over Munich, Germany, 19 April 1945.

that is easily remedied
by, say an additional
photograph [of German
aircraft grounded due

violate the Interpretive Development
Guidelines of the Canadian War
Museum as circulated to me.
However, whether intended or not
(and I do not believe that it was the
intent of the CWM) it is possible for
some visitors to conclude that the
CBO exhibit has “taken sides” in the
now long running controversy that
pits the morality of the CBO against
its utility due to some unfortunate
wording and the juxtaposition of both
text and photos….” I was referring
here to the photo of burned German
corpses that had been placed to the
left of the panel in question.

to lack of fuel] and a graph or
chart [of the decline of German war
production]…. I think that although
the text panel in question does
present some current understanding
of “some of the impacts of the
bombing campaign,” it could very
easily present more of the actual
dilemma faced by Allied leaders by
presenting a greater emphasis on
the damage done to the German war
effort by the CBO. The CBO killed
large numbers of German civilians.
It was intended to do so whether or
not air crews were let in on the secret.
The killing of those civilians was an

6
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inevitable outcome of the need to
critically damage the German ability
to wage war well in advance of the
break-in to Germany on the ground.
War is by its very nature a collective
act and no one who is a part of the
collectivity that is at war can expect
to be saved harmless from it. The
ultimate immorality would have
been to not fight the Nazis with all
the power at the command of the
Allied leadership. In my view, this
is a truism that is not put clearly
enough in this exhibit.12

To summarize, I challenged the
historical accuracy of the panel and
suggested some minor changes in
the text to make it right. I suggested
adding a chart showing the decline
in German war production as it
was and a photo of German aircraft
sitting idle due to the success of the
bombing campaign against German
fuel production. I did not draw
conclusions based on the objections of
the veterans and I did not disparage
the professionalism nor the integrity
of the CWM’s historical staff. I
thought they had got it wrong and
that since the matter was now in the
public realm, they ought to make the
very slight modifications I suggested
to get it historically accurate. Let me
emphasize; in my reading of dozens
of books and articles on the bomber
war including the Speer memoirs and
other related sources, there is simply
no doubt that the bombing campaign
made a contribution to Allied victory
and to state that it did not “until late
in the war” is just plain wrong.
My position four years ago
and now is that when unwarranted
changes to an exhibit are demanded
by a part of the public for emotional
or political reasons they ought to be
strongly resisted. I do understand
why many veterans were offended.
But that was and is not sufficient
reason to alter the conclusions that
historians arrive at. On the other
hand, all of us historians make
mistakes. When those mistakes are
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2011

pointed out to us, we ought to revise
our work. With great respect, I don’t
know why the collective historians of
the CWM should live by a different
set of rules than I do. And that is why
I made the suggestions I did.
In the end my report and those of
my three colleagues were submitted
to Dr. Rabinovitch. Desmond Morton
and Margaret MacMillan had urged
that no changes be made in the exhibit,
while Serge Bernier questioned
whether the panel was even necessary.
Dr. Rabinovitch summarized our
findings in a 7 March 2007 letter to
Claudette Roy, chair of the Canadian
Museum of Civilization Corporation
Board of Trustees. In that letter Dr.
Rabinovitch summarized the process
by which we had been chosen and
what we had written. In light of
the lack of unanimity among us, he
wrote, he would have to “draw his
own conclusions,” namely “that the
bomber command section, including
the text panel in question, provides a
balanced presentation and does take
into account the best information
known to historians today.” Thus
he would “ask the museum staff to
consider how to draw attention to
the range of literature and opinions
available on this subject” so that
“visitors will thus be encouraged to
enquire further in order to draw their
personal conclusions.” There was no
indication whatever in the letter that
the words of the controversial panel
were to be changed.13 On 11 March
Dr. Rabinovitch e-mailed all of us,
told us of his letter to Ms Roy, and
made no mention of any decision to
change the panel’s wording.14 In fact
I did not learn until October when
I was contacted by a CBC reporter
that a new text for the panel had
been decided on. I thought the new
wording more accurate but confusing
and somewhat convoluted. Certainly
it was too long and it meandered like
a yazoo stream. It reminds me of the
proverbial camel – a horse invented
by a committee.

My role in the controversy ended
then. But the controversy was not
over. The Senate conducted hearings
into the panel; I did not take part and
I did not approve of the hearings. In
the fall of 2008 Margaret MacMillan,
Robert Bothwell, and Randall Hansen,
who had just published Fire and Fury:
The Allied Bombing of Germany, 19421945 co-authored a Queen’s Quarterly
article entitled “Controversy,
Commemoration, and Capitulation;
The Canadian War Museum and
Bomber Command.” Several pages
into the article the authors wrote “the
other two historians [David Bercuson
and Serge Bernier] admitted the fact
of the controversy but found the
exhibit tendentious and hurtful to
the veterans.” 15 That was wrong.
What I did say was that “whether
intended or not (and I do not believe
that it was the intent of the CWM)
it is possible for some visitors to
conclude that the CBO exhibit has
‘taken sides’ in the now long running
controversy…”. I also said “As to
the photos, I believe that the photos,
especially that of partially denuded,
burned, etc., human remains has
added to the sting of the words for
some veterans.” Those were the only
times I used the word “veteran”
in my report. The authors of the
Queen’s Quarterly article defended the
panel’s statement that “bombing had
relatively small effects on German
industrial production until late in
the war.” They did point out that
some people disagreed with that
conclusion, but the only challenger
they mentioned was retired CDS
Paul Manson. They did not mention
Tooze, Gentile, Levine, or any other
of the reputable scholars who took
opposing views. Their main thrust
was that the war museum had been
attacked by the veterans, that the
museum had caved in and that the
precedent set was a very bad one.
That may be so – I still have no idea
why the panel was changed or how
the new wording was arrived at – but
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I never saw myself as being part of an
attack on the war museum
Margaret MacMillan wrote of
the controversy in her book, The
Uses and Abuses of History (2008)
repeating in a more condensed
form the reasons laid out in the
Queen’s Quarterly article as to why
she believed the exhibit ought not to
have been changed. Randall Hansen’s
book Fire and Fury summarized the
dispute in its preface but one of the
strongest and most ironic themes of
his book is just how truly effective
American bombing became by mid1944, especially in hitting oil targets
and the aircraft industry. Hansen
contrasts the US air campaign to that
of Harris, who in Hansen’s view,
stuck to area bombing and to his
intention to kill as many Germans
as he could wherever they were no
matter how much his boss Portal
tried to convince him otherwise. The
key chapter is entitled “Oil and baby
Killing.”16
One of the most cogent analyses
of the controversy to appear was that
of Professor David Dean, director
of the Carleton Centre for Public
History. In a March 2009 article for
Museum and Society Dean pointed
out that although the war museum’s
mandate is to be a museum and not
a memorial – unlike the Australian
War Memorial – the CWM is in reality
“both a history museum and a palace
of memory; indeed for some it is a
secular sacred space.” He points to
the presence of the Royal Canadian
Legion Hall of Honour, the model of
the War memorial, Regeneration Hall
and the memorial Hall “dominated
by the grave of the Unknown Soldier,
stone walls cut to resemble the
thousands of tombstones marking
graves of the Canadians fallen in
Europe…” This is, he says, not only
a museum, but a “sacred site, a site
of memory, of contemplation.”17 His
point, I think, is that the very layout
and construction of the building may
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have led some to believe that the
CWM’s job was to honour without
hesitation and to write no words
or display no panels or artefacts
that jarred the process of honour no
matter what the museum’s official
mandate is.
But that is part of another debate.
My reason for being here today is to
set the record straight about how I
became involved in the controversy,
how I arrived at the conclusions
I did, and what role I played in
re-writing the panel in question –
namely, none at all. The controversy
about the morality of killing German
(and Japanese) citizens will go on.
It should go on. And more research
is necessary from Axis public and
private sources to determine the
actual impact of the bombing. It is
surely time to end the almost slavish
reliance of early writers on the
opaque findings of the USSBS and
the BBSU. The evidence is still there
and more and more scholars will find
it. Indeed, in that part of his book
about the US air war, even Randall
Hansen found it. In a telling passage
of his book describing a conversation
before the December 1944 Battle of
the Bulge between Speer and Albert
Vögler, who was both a strong Nazi
and an industrialist, Speer declares: “I
think…that Hitler is playing his last
card and knows it, too. Vögler flashed
Speer an almost contemptuous look.
Of course it’s his last card, now that
our production is collapsing right,
left, and centre.”18 No serious scholar,
whether a single author or a museum
staff, should be saved from the ageold processes of historical review,
revision and re-writing to reflect
more recent research when it is more
accurate.
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